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THE GROSSBEAST OF BURDEN OF PROOF:
Experimental Evidence on How the Burden
of Proof Influences Employment
Discrimination Case Outcomes
David Sherwyn & Michael Heiset
Scholarly and public attention to the burden of proof and jury instructions
has increased dramatically since the Supreme Court's 2009 decision in
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. Gross holds that the so-called mixed-
motive jury instruction, which we call the motivating factor instruction, is
not available in age, and possibly disability and retaliation cases. The
decision prompted an outcry from the plaintiffs' bar and Congress has
proposed legislation to overturn Gross. Despite the outcry, a simple
question persists: Does the motivating factor jury instruction influence case
outcomes? Results from our experimental mock jury study suggest that such
jury instructions do influence outcomes in employment discrimination
cases. Moreover, we also found a defect in the standard jury instruction
that neither Gross nor the proposed legislation corrects or even addresses:
the motivating factor instruction misleads juries and fuels unintended costs
and fee awards to employees. Our paper proposes two corrections, one for
Congress and one for the courts, either of which would correct the
motivating factor defect and provide more certainty and fairness for
employment discrimination litigants.
Is it really lawful for an employment decision to be motivated by age,
but not by race, sex, color, national origin, or religion? The U.S. Supreme
Court concluded in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.' that such was
Congress's intent and is, therefore, the law.2 On the other hand, because
Gross addresses the burden of proof in "mixed-motive" cases, it could be a
t David Sherwyn is Associate Professor of Law, Cornell University School of Hotel
Administration; Michael Heise is Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. We thank Daniel
Saperstein (Proskauer Rose LLP, Newark, NJ) and Nick Menillo (Cornell Law School, Class of
2012) for excellent research assistance.
1. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
2. Id. at 2352 ("We hold that a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant to
the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the 'but-for' cause of
the challenged adverse employment action.").
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hollow decision.3 Despite at least nine Supreme Court cases,4 hundreds of
lower court opinions, and thousands of law review pages,5 some claim that
the burden of proof and the accompanying jury instructions in employment
discrimination cases are meaningless.6 Jurors, many argue, simply decide
who should prevail regardless of jury instructions and the burden of proof.7
This argument generates two research questions: (1) what is the law with
regard to burden of proof? and (2) does the burden of proof influence
outcomes in employment discrimination cases?
This Article addresses both questions. In the first section we examine the
law's path from McDonnell Douglas v. Green,8 to Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,9 to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, l° to Desert Palace, Inc. v.
3. See id. at 2350 ("Our inquiry therefore must focus on the text of the ADEA to decide
whether it authorizes a mixed-motives age discrimination claim.").
4. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248 (1981); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases:
Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1981); Michael Evan Gold,
Towards a Unified Theory of the Law of Employment Discrimination, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 175 (2001); Sandra F. Sperino, Recreating Diversity in Employment Law by Debunking
the Myth of the McDonnell Douglas Monolith, 44 Hous. L. REV. 349 (2007).
6. See Sandra F. Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell Douglas Is
Not Justified by Any Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 Hous. L. REV. 743, 791-93
(2006) ("One place where confusion over the burden-shifting framework's proper use is most
visible relates to jury instructions. When discrimination cases go to trial, the McDonnell
Douglas test raises unnecessary complications for both the judge and the jury. Even thirty years
after the test's creation, courts continue to struggle with how to incorporate its rationale into
jury instructions. Indeed, the circuits are currently split regarding how and whether to instruct
the jury on the three-part framework. Some courts incorporate McDonnell Douglas into the jury
instructions by instructing the jury on the changing burdens of production and persuasion.
However, most circuits have issued opinions indicating that McDonnell Douglas should not be
used in jury instructions .... The best argument against construing McDonnell Douglas as an
evidentiary framework is the fact that the majority of circuits discourage the use of the three-
part burden-shifting framework in jury instructions. Thus, if the test is designed to help
factfinders sift through evidence to determine whether discrimination has occurred, the courts
have essentially made the test meaningless at trial in cases presented to a jury. In these cases,
McDonnell Douglas has become an evidentiary standard without a factfinder.") (footnotes
omitted); see also Gerrilyn G. Brill, Instructing the Jury in an Employment Discrimination
Case, 1998 FED. CTS. L. REV. 2, pt. 4, § B, 3 (noting that once the case is submitted to the
jury, the McDonnell Douglas formulation is irrelevant).
7. See Brill, supra note 6.
8. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
9. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2008).
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Costa," and finally, to Gross and its progeny. Tracking the evolution of the
mixed-motive jury instruction reveals that while the mixed-motive (or as we
call it the motivating factor) instruction is (or should be) available in the
vast majority of Title VII discrimination cases,12 after Gross it is not
available in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 13 and
perhaps unavailable in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),14 and
retaliation cases. 5 Instead, after Gross, employees pursuing ADEA, and
possibly ADA and retaliation, claims against employers will receive the so-
called pretext jury instructions. The existence of this anomaly prompts our
second research question regarding whether jury instructions matter in
terms of outcomes.
In section two, we present results from a two-year experimental study on
the burden of proof and its potential influence on employment
discrimination litigation outcomes. Findings from our study suggest that
while the outcomes (involving employer liability) are comparable, plaintiffs
in cases with a motivating factor jury instruction were significantly more
likely to receive litigation costs and attorney fees than plaintiffs in cases
with the pretext jury instruction. " What makes this finding critically
important is that leading practitioners commonly construe many
employment discrimination claims as "fee cases."' 7 In so-called "fee cases,"
the costs and fees incident to an employer's defense approach sometimes
exceed the potential damages available to the plaintiff. Thus, in these
instances and from an employer's economic perspective, whether an
employee will be awarded costs and attorney fees is more important than
the liability determination.
Our findings imply that jury instruction variations effectively
"discriminate" against ADEA (and possibly ADA and retaliation) plaintiffs
11. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2008).
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2009).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2008).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1972); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (1990). But
see Smith v. Xerox, No. 08-11115, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 6190, at *16-19 (5th Cir. Mar. 24,
2010) (holding that the mixed-motive instruction is available in Title VII retaliation cases).
16. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973).
17. See David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher, & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for
Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1557, 1574
n.88 (2005); David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory
Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and
Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 93 n.106 (1999). In
some cases back pay may be marginal, because the employee earned a modest wage or quickly
replaced his job, but the litigation costs may still run hundreds of thousands of dollars. Other
times, both the back pay and the attorney fees are high. It is very rare, if not impossible, for
there to be high back pay and low fees.
903
HeinOnline  -- 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 903 2010-2011
ARIZONA STATE LA WJOURNAL
by excluding them from the Title VII windfall that misleads jurors in ways
that favor employees over employers. One potential consequence is that
plaintiff lawyers may shy away from ADEA cases" and are less inclined to
take ADA19 and retaliation cases."0 Another consequence is that employers
might be more likely to settle meritless Title VII cases to reduce their
exposure to employee cost and fee awards. Along with highlighting the
burden of proof s import in the employment discrimination context, our
study's findings also illustrate the need for changes in the law that endeavor
to: (1) provide a coherent standard for the different types of discrimination
and (2) reduce the likelihood of juror misunderstanding.
In section three, we consider proposals designed to reduce current
problems associated with jury instructions in employment discrimination
cases. Notably, Congress is currently considering a bill, the Protecting
Older Workers against Discrimination Act (POWDA), which seeks to
overturn Gross.21 Given the current political climate, most correctly assume
that the prospects for any new employment law bill being passed are, at
best, dim.22 We contend, however, that POWDA may have a better chance
of enactment than other employment-related bills because it protects older
Americans and is deficit-neutral.
Unfortunately, even if passed, as currently drafted the POWDA solves
one problem while ignoring another. While only Congress or the Supreme
Court can overturn Gross, trial courts can, nonetheless, solve the juror
misunderstanding problem by providing jurors with fuller information about
the practical economic consequences of their decisions. Access to more
information should reduce the likelihood of jurors unintentionally awarding
costs and fees to employees in Title VII cases, diminish employers'
18. ADA cases are regarded as one of the most difficult types of cases to pursue. See Ruth
Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 99, 99-100 (1999) (finding that ADA plaintiffs' success rates at trial and on appeal are
worse than those of plaintiffs in comparable areas of law-"only prisoner rights cases fare as
poorly").
19. ADEA cases are considered employee-friendly, largely because of the damages
scheme. See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
20. Plaintiffs favor retaliation cases. See Wayne N. Outten et al., When Your Employer
Thinks You Acted Disloyally: The Guarantees and Uncertainties of Retaliation Law, 693 PRAC.
L. INST.-LITIG. 151, 153 (2003) ("In part due to the success rate of retaliation claims before
juries, more and more plaintiffs are adding retaliation to their discrimination and whistle blower
claims.").
21. Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 111th Cong.
(2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h 111-3721.
22. See Susan McGolrick et al., Possible Changes in Law, Federal Labor Relations
Discussed, 14 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BULL. (BNA) 149, para. 6 (Dec. 3, 2009) (stating that
"[t]here have always been 'deep divisions' and controversy in the field of labor law").
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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incentive to settle such claims, and dampen plaintiff lawyers' motivation to
preference Title VII cases over ADEA, ADA, and retaliation cases.
I. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES UNDER
TITLE VII AND THE ADEA
Most employment discrimination cases fall into two general categories:
disparate treatment (intentional discrimination)23 and disparate impact
(unintentional discrimination).24 Disparate impact (also described as adverse
impact) occurs when a company has a policy or practice that, while neutral
on its face, adversely affects a protected class. In a leading case, Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., an employer required employees who wanted to work in
any but the lowest job classification to have a high school diploma and pass
a standardized test.25 While passing a test or holding a high school degree
remains facially neutral, these two standards eliminated a substantially
greater number of black employees than white employees from
consideration.26 In Griggs, the employer argued that it could not be found
liable absent intent to discriminate.2 7 The Court rejected this argument and
held that if the plaintiff using statistics proves that a neutral policy or
practice has an adverse impact on a protected class, the employer must in
turn prove that such a policy is justified as a "business necessity.' 28
While the Supreme Court has addressed adverse impact cases on a few
occasions,29 with two of these rulings3" fueling31 the Civil Rights Act of
23. First explained by the courts in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-07 (1973), based on an interpretation of § 703(a)(1) of Title VII.
24. The Supreme Court described this method of proving discrimination in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-35 (1971), based on a construction of § 703(a)(2) of Title VII.
25. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28.
26. Id. at 429-30.
27. Id. at 428-29.
28. Id. at 431 ("The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited."). Courts have continued to struggle with defining the business necessity
justification. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658-61 (1989);
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-36 (1975); Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp.
Auth., 308 F.3d 286, 289 (3d Cir. 2002); and Congress's subsequent action with the CRA of
1991. For a further discussion of the business necessity defense, see generally Susan S. Grover,
The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REv. 387
(1996); Linda Lye, Title VII's Tangled Tale: The Erosion and Confusion of Disparate Impact
and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 315, 320-34, 348-52
(1998).
29. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 645-61; Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977, 986-1000 (1988); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442-56 (1982); N.Y. City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 577-94 (1979); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-37
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1991 (CRA of 1991),32 the vast majority of discrimination cases are
disparate treatment or intentional discrimination cases.33 Consistent with the
distribution of employment discrimination cases in the real world, our study
focuses on the burden of proof in disparate treatment cases.
Disparate treatment cases are particularly difficult to assess because fact
finders must ascribe motivation to the actions of the employer.34 Since few,
if any, employers admit to an unlawful intent, and because most employers
are now sophisticated enough to avoid creating the proverbial smoking gun
that would easily establish unlawful intent, 35 the courts are typically left to
decide how to determine whether an employer intentionally discriminated.
Before examining how courts allocate the burden of proof, it is important to
briefly explore the three main discrimination statutes which structure much
of the employment law litigation.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) makes it unlawful to
discriminate on the basis of sex, race, religion, color, and national origin.36
The ADEA makes it unlawful to discriminate against employees and
applicants over forty years of age.37 The ADA makes it unlawful to
discriminate against employees who are disabled under the law. 38 Each of
the statutes prohibits retaliation against those who oppose such
(1977); Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 425; Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 87, 92 (1973);
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-36.
30. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 645-61; Watson, 487 U.S. at 982-1000.
31. See Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill, "a Codification
of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 287,
289 (1993) (acknowledging that the Act was a response to Wards Cove); Charles Sullivan, The
World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White Males, 98 Nw. U. L. REv.
1505, 1518 n.58 (2004) ("The legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act is replete with
attacks on Wards Cove.").
32. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, § 2 (1991) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2008)) ("[T]he decision of the Supreme Court in [Wards Cove]
has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections.").
33. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 989 (1991) (illustrating that in 1989 only 101
of 7,613 Title VII discrimination cases were tried under disparate impact theory).
34. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000) ("The
ultimate question in every discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is
whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination.").
35. Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Because employers
rarely leave a paper trail-or 'smoking gun'-attesting to a discriminatory intent, disparate
treatment plaintiffs often must build their cases from pieces of circumstantial evidence which
cumulatively undercut the credibility of the various explanations offered by the employer.")
(citations omitted).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2008).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)-(b) (1989).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2008).
[Ariz. St. L.J.906
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discrimination or participate in discrimination litigation.3 9 For all intents
and purposes, the ADEA and ADA amended Title VII by adding two new
protected classes.4" In fact, Congress expressly did this with respect to the
coverage and damages set forth in the ADA. Although Congress could have
accomplished this with the ADEA as well, Congress chose a different path.
Instead of following Title VII, Congress modeled the ADEA after the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1935 (FLSA). 41 The effect of this, unlike Gross,
was to make the ADEA friendlier for plaintiffs and their lawyers and more
expensive for employers.
In 1967 (when Congress passed the ADEA), damages flowing from Title
VII liability were limited to back pay, reinstatement, costs, and fees.42
Moreover, there were no jury trials. The ADEA provides for the same
damages as Title VII and, in addition, liquidated damages if the conduct is
deemed willful. 43 Liquidated damages equal back pay; thus, for willful
conduct, prevailing employees receive double back pay.4 4
The concept of doubling back pay if the conduct is willful, however, is
not logical in ADEA cases. Under the FLSA it is possible to intentionally,
while not willfully, violate the statute.45 An employer can refuse to pay
overtime to an employee that the company wrongfully, but truly believes is
exempt.4 6 Only in extraordinarily few cases do employers intentionally base
a decision on age, but do not willfully run afoul of the statute. 47 The ADEA
39. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2008); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1972); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)
(1990).
40. TIMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS
LIMITATIONS 460-61 (Wolters Kluwer 2007) (discussing the two acts as links in a series of
employment discrimination laws beginning with Title VII).
41. Sperling v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 24 F.3d 463, 468 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Congress
borrowed portions of many other statutes[, incorporating] parts of the FLSA.").
42. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 allowed for compensatory and punitive damages for
Title VII intentional discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)-(c) (1991). But see Kolstad v. Am.
Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 529-30 (1999) (restricting the extent of punitive damages for Title
VII and ADA).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2009); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 614
(1993); Mathis v. Phillips Chevrolet, Inc., 269 F.3d 771, 777 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Under the
ADEA, courts are required to assess liquidated damages in the same amount as the
compensatory damages if the employer's violation of the statute was 'willful.').
44. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1974). For the penalties resulting from "willful" violations, see
29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (2008).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 260; see also 29 C.F.R. § 790.22(b)-(c) (2010).
47. For examples of approved age-based assessments, see Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1985) (approving age classifications in the narrow instance of
a "bona fide occupational qualification") and Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977)
(stating the bona fide occupational qualification was "meant to be an extremely narrow
exception to the general prohibition").
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also provided for jury trials in 1967. As a consequence, the ADEA, prior to
Gross and the CRA of 1991, was, owing to congressional intent, a much
more potent statute for employees than Title VII.
The CRA of 1991 added jury trials and punitive and compensatory
damages to Title VII.48 The amount of punitive damages available to
successful litigants is a function of the size of an offending employer's
workforce.49 Damages for companies with fewer than 100 employees are
capped at $50,000. 5' The cap increases to $300,000 for employers with
more than 500 employees, and there are different caps for those with more
than 100 and fewer than 500 employees." Thus, a thirty-eight-year-old
woman who earns $2,000,000 annually from her investment firm with forty
employees will receive a maximum of $4,050,000 if she is fired because of
her sex and is out of work for two years. If she were forty-two, fired
because of her age, and out of work for two years, however, she could
receive $8,000,000. Damages under the ADA mirror those provided by
Title VII. 
52
Aside from damages and the fact that Title VII and the ADA cover
employers with fifteen employees or more, and the ADEA covers those
with twenty employees or more, the statutes in application are seemingly
identical.5 3 Moreover, once a case reaches the courts, the method of proof is
the same.5 4 Thus, a forty-two-year-old female paraplegic could bring a
discrimination case under the three statutes (plus state and local laws) under
the same burden of proof rubric. Before we explain the evolution of this
rubric, however, it is important to examine the burden of proof.
Although Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA each expressly state that
employers may not discriminate because of the certain characteristics
protected by the statutes, the statutes do not explain how parties prove their
48. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, § 102(b) (1991)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)).
49. Id. § 102(b)(3).
50. Id. § 102(b)(3)(A).
51. Id. § 102(b)(3)(B)-(D).
52. GLYNN, supra note 40, at 621 (generalizing that Title VII and the ADA have similar
remedial options).
53. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2354 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The relevant language in the two statutes is identical, and we have long recognized that our
interpretations of Title VII's language apply 'with equal force in the context of age
discrimination, for the substantive provisions of the ADEA ....') (citations omitted).
54. See William R. Corbett, The "Fall" of Summers, the Rise of "Pretext Plus," and the
Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employment at Will:
Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REv. 305, 322 n.78 (1996) (showing disparate
treatment discrimination applies to Title VII, ADA, ADEA, and all require same proof
structure).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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case, which side has the burden of proof, or how much, if any,
discrimination is tolerated. Thus, the methods, burdens, and standards of
proof were developed by the courts in a series of Supreme Court and lower
court decisions, modified by Congress in the CRA of 1991, and then
subsequently refined by Costa, Gross, and a host of lower court decisions.5
To fully understand the current state of the burden of proof, it is necessary
to understand its evolution, beginning with McDonnell Douglas.
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court established the method of proof in
discrimination cases. The Court concluded that to prove discrimination,
employees first had to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. To
prove a prima facie case, employees had to prove that: (1) they belonged to
a protected class; (2) they were minimally qualified for the position in
question and that they applied; (3) they suffered an adverse employment
decision; and (4) the job remained open or the job was filled by an applicant
outside the protected class. 6 In subsequent years, courts tweaked the fourth
element to be applicable to termination cases by stating the employee had to
prove that similarly situated employees outside the protected class engaged
in similar conduct, but were treated differently."
The establishment of the prima facie case creates a rebuttable
presumption that the employer discriminated. Employers can refute this
presumption by producing (not proving) a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for the decision. 9 If the employer satisfies this burden, the employee
could, in turn, prove discrimination by establishing that the real reason for
55. For cases pre-Costa, see Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding
that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to establish that she was replaced by a person outside of her
protected class to satisfy the burden under McDonnell Douglas), Carson v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that there is a prima facie case even if one
white worker is replaced by another white worker), Hong v. Children's Memorial Hospital, 993
F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993), and Johnson v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 545-46
(8th Cir. 1993) (holding when a single employee is discharged, the plaintiff must present
evidence of satisfactory work to meet the burden).
56. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) ("This may be done by
showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.").
57. See Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 673 (1st Cir. 1996) (phrasing the
fourth prong as "replaced by another with similar skills and qualifications"); Lipsett v. Univ. of
P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 899 (1st Cir. 1988) (crafting the language of the fourth prong as "the
employer sought someone to perform the same work after he or she left"). Furthermore, the
courts recognized that some employees may not apply for the jobs and thus, prong two was
modified as well.
58. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
59. Id. at 802.
909
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the decision was discrimination or that the reason articulated by the
employer is pretextual-unworthy of belief.6" McDonnell Douglas was
questioned and refined in a number of subsequent decisions.6" In Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,62 the Court of Appeals held
that the employer had to prove that: (1) the articulated reason was the real
reason for the decision and (2) the person hired was more qualified than the
plaintiff.63 The Burdine court rejected this holding and reiterated that the
employer need only articulate a non-discriminatory reason and that there
was no obligation to hire the best candidate for a job. 4 Instead, the
employer simply could not discriminate.65
In 1989, the Supreme Court confronted another genre of employment
discrimination-the so-called mixed-motive case. In Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,66 the plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, alleged that despite her excellent
performance she was denied partnership on two separate occasions because
of her sex.67 To prove her case, she presented evidence that in advising her
how to succeed after her first failure, partners suggested that she, for
example: (1) wear make-up; (2) get her hair done; (3) stop cursing; and (4)
walk, talk, and act in a more feminine manner. 68 The employer argued that
while plaintiffs performance was strong, her interpersonal skills were
weak, and that the company did not promote associates to partnership who
had such flaws.69
The Supreme Court accepted that the employer had both legitimate (the
interpersonal skills) and illegitimate (the sex-based factors listed above)
reasons for its conduct.7" The question for the Court was what to do in such
situations. The answer remained confusing and, in fact, the Court produced
60. Id. at 807.
61. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc, 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000); St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981).
62. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
63. Id. at 251-52.
64. Id. at 256-59.
65. Id. at 257.
66. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
67. Id. at 231-32.
68. Id. at 235.
69. Many partners simply did not get along with Hopkins and stated that, "She tended to
alienate the staff in that she was extremely overbearing. Ann needs improvement in her
interpersonal skills." Further, partners were bothered by "the arrogance [and] self-centered
attitude that Ann projects." Other partners saw her positive attributes and her negatives, "I
found her to be (a) singularly dedicated, (b) rather unpleasant." Cynthia Estlund, The Story of
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 65, 69-70 (Joel W.
Friedman ed., 2006).
70. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234-35.
910 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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no majority opinion. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion established a new
scheme for proving discrimination. Under the plurality opinion, plaintiffs
satisfy their burden by proving that discrimination was a motivating part of
the employer's decision.7" The employer, according to Brennan's opinion,
could escape liability by proving that it would have made the same decision
regardless of the protected class.72
While six justices agreed with Brennan's two-prong and true burden-
shifting approach, they did not agree on the standard needed for a case to
fall into this classification. Accordingly, Justice O'Connor's concurrence
was widely accepted as the functional holding in the case.73 O'Connor's
opinion states that the shift in the burden of proof inherent in the mixed-
motive analysis is only available when the employee proves, with direct
evidence, that the protected class was a substantial factor in the employer's
decision.74 Like Brennan's opinion, O'Connor's holding allowed employers
to escape liability if they could prove that they would have made the same
decision regardless of the protected class. The dissenting justices opposed
burden-shifting and argued that the plaintiff always bore the burden of
proving that discrimination was the "but for" reason for the employer's
decision.75
In addition to arguing for a "but for" standard, dissenting Justices
contended that the holding created unnecessary confusion for employers
and courts.76 To be sure, this argument has merit.77 There were numerous
cases where the parties argued whether certain evidence could be
considered direct evidence. In addition, in other cases, seemingly
meaningless words or even a court reporter's mistake determined the
burden of proof.78 Despite these problems, McDonnell Douglas, Burdine,
7 1. Id. at 240-42.
72. Id.
73. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (noting that the holding of the
Court is the narrowest point on which five justices agree).
74. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 282-84 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 286-87.
77. For the differing definitions of "direct evidence," see Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc.,
188 F.3d 1204, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 1999), Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995),
and Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 181-82 (2d Cir. 1992). See
generally Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: A
Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REv. 651 (2000).
78. For how courts have analyzed certain "code" words, see Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546
U.S. 454, 456 (2006), McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2004),
and Putman v. Unity Health Systems, 348 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2003). In Austin v. Cornell
University, 891 F. Supp. 740 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), a deponent responded to the question: "so you
said you wanted some fresh blood?" with the question: "I did?" The court reporter missed the
911
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and Price Waterhouse, when cobbled together, created a relatively
straightforward framework for proving discrimination cases. Cases with
direct evidence, where discrimination played a substantial role, were labeled
"mixed-motive." Cases with circumstantial or no evidence at all were
analyzed under the so-called "pretext" model. This framework, however,
did not last long.
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,7 9 the plaintiff alleged that he was
terminated because of his race.80 The employer, in contrast, argued that it
terminated Hicks for poor work performance.8" The District Court held that
the articulated reason was not true and instead, the supervisors engaged in a
crusade to terminate the plaintiff. Because, however, the plaintiff proved
that the crusade was personally and not racially motivated, the District
Court found for the employer.8 2 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed and
held that when the proffered reasons are found to be untrue the employee
has proven pretext and the plaintiff prevails as a matter of law.83 The
Supreme Court reversed and held that the plaintiff will prevail, as a matter
of law, only if the employee proves pretext and provides evidence that the
real reason was discrimination.84
Many commentators refer to this as "pretext plus. '' 85 Despite Justice
Souter's assertions in his dissent, the case expressly stated that fact finders
were free to infer discrimination from a finding of pretext, but they did not
have to.86 Still, reaction to Hicks from employee rights advocates was swift
and strong. Employee advocates contended that by requiring evidence of
discrimination, Hicks made prevailing in discrimination cases nearly
impossible for employees.87 While "impossible" may be too strong, Hicks
did, in fact, alter employment discrimination's legal terrain.
inflection and the transcript stated: "I did." The court allowed a mixed-motive instruction based
on the deposition.
79. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
80. Id. at 504-05.
81. Id.
82. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
83. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., Div. of Adult Insts. of the Dep't of Corr., 970 F.2d
487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992).
84. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515-16.
85. See id. at 535-36 (Souter, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 511.
87. See, e.g., Employment Discrimination Evidentiary Amendment of 1993, H.R. 2787,
103d Cong. (1993) (proposing an amendment to Title VII that would override the majority
holding in Hicks); Civil Rights Standards Restoration Act, S. 1776, 103d Cong. (1993)
(proposing an amendment to the Revised Statutes § 1979 that would restore the pre-Hicks
plaintiffs burden in intentional discrimination cases); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet:
Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229 (1995); Sherie L. Coons, Comment,
Proving Disparate Treatment After St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Is Anything Left of
[Ariz. St. L.J.912
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However one may characterize the array of changes wrought by Hicks,
one consequence, as feared by employee advocates, is an increase in the
probability of false-negative outcomes. Specifically, employers who
discriminate, but are savvy enough to avoid leaving the proverbial smoking
gun, can discriminate without undue exposure to legal liability. On the other
hand, however, the Burdine holding, where a finding of pretext results in an
automatic victory for the employee, increases prospects for false-positive
outcomes. Specifically, employers that did not discriminate were
nonetheless unduly exposed to liability. Justice Scalia's majority opinion
provides an illustrative hypothetical. "
Justice Scalia's hypothetical assumes that forty percent of an employer's
workforce is drawn from a protected minority group that comprised only ten
percent of the available workforce. An applicant from that particular
minority group applies and is rejected by a decision maker who belongs to
that same minority group. That decision maker is later terminated and is
either unavailable or unwilling to help the employer when the applicant files
McDonnell Douglas?, 19 J. CORP. L. 379, 408 (1994) ("The Hicks majority's holding is ill-
conceived and furthers unsound policy because . .. [it] places an impossible burden of
persuasion on plaintiffs ...."); Derrick L. Homer, Recent Development, Toward Clarifying the
Ambiguity of Merging Burdens-St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), 11
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 205, 213 (1994) (concluding that Hicks confronts plaintiffs with an
"impossible burden of having to disprove any reason for the employer's action a factfinder
might see sketched in the record"); Shannon R. Joseph, Note, Employment Discrimination:
Shouldering the Burden of Proof After St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 29 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 963, 988-89, 992-95 (1994) (contrasting civil rights attorneys' reactions to Hicks with
that of management attorneys and evaluating proposed legislation attempting to overturn Hicks);
Michael C. McPhillips, Note, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: The Casual Abandonment of
Title VII Precedent, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (1994) ("[T]he court's newly-developed
burdens will make it impossible for many plaintiffs to get beyond summary judgment ... [and]
might chill their initiation of legitimate claims."); Louis M. Rappaport, Note, St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks: Has the Supreme Court Turned its Back on Title VII by Rejecting "Pretext-
Only? ", 39 VILL. L. REv. 123 (1994); Ronald A. Schmidt, Note, The Plaintiff's Burden in Title
VII Disparate Treatment Cases: Discrimination Vel Non-St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,
113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), 73 NEB. L. REv. 953, 976-81 (1994) (summarizing criticism of Hicks
but concluding that a Hicks plaintiff bears no greater burden than that of any other civil
plaintiff); Note, Title VII-Burden of Persuasion in Disparate Treatment Cases, 107 HARV. L.
REv. 342, 349 (1993) (arguing that requiring the plaintiff to show direct evidence of intent "will
severely curtail the ability of many Title VII plaintiffs to succeed on their disparate treatment
claims"); EEOC Urges Congress to Overturn Supreme Court's 1993 Hicks Decision, 1993
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 193, Oct. 7, 1993, at D-7 (quoting EEOC Chairman as saying of
post-Hicks litigation, "it may be impossible to prove discrimination in the absence of direct
evidence, which is so rarely available"); Management, Civil Rights Attorneys Differ on Effect of
Hicks Decision, 1993 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 126, July 2, 1993, at D-26 (quoting
numerous employee groups characterizing the decision as a "[huge] blow to civil rights
advocates" and calling for a legislative response).
88. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 513-14.
HeinOnline  -- 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 913 2010-2011
ARIZONA STATE LA W JOURNAL
a discrimination charge. The employer attempts to find the "real" reason for
the decision, but the plaintiffs lawyer successfully argues the reason to be
untrue. The jury is therefore instructed it must find for the employee. In his
opinion, Scalia argued that such a finding was untenable. 9 Title VII and the
other discrimination statues are not, according to Hicks, the truth in
employment acts, and the remedy for lying is perjury, not discrimination
liability.90 We believe that neither Hicks nor Burdine is perfect. Hicks fuels
false-negative results and Burdine stimulates false-positive results. If
eliminating discrimination is the goal, Burdine is the better approach, but it
comes at a cost of increasing employers' exposure to liability.
After Hicks, plaintiffs needed evidence to automatically prevail. While
plaintiffs could prevail if the fact finder inferred discrimination from a
finding of pretext, counting on such an inference is a very risky proposition
for a plaintiff lawyer. Professor Estreicher refers to cases without evidence
as "orphan" cases; they simply cannot find a lawyer to take them.9" As a
consequence there were two types of cases: (1) plaintiffs with
circumstantial evidence, who had to pursue pretext cases; and (2) plaintiffs
with direct evidence, who could pursue mixed-motive cases. Because of the
burden of proof shift in mixed-motive cases, however, it seemed plaintiffs
should have preferred mixed-motive cases. Plaintiffs' preference for mixed-
motive cases should have increased dramatically after the passage of the
CRA of 1991.
The CRA of 1991 provided for jury trials in Title VII cases, codified the
concept of and altered the burden of proof in disparate impact cases, added
punitive and compensatory damages, and, most importantly for the purpose
of this Article, partially overturned Price Waterhouse. Under the CRA of
1991: (1) the plaintiff can satisfy the first prong and thus, shift the burden of
proof if the protected class was a motivating (as opposed to a substantial)
factor in the employer decision and (2) the employer does not escape
liability if it proves that it would have made the decision regardless of the
protected class. Instead, plaintiffs receive a declaratory judgment, and may
receive costs and attorney fees, if they can satisfy the first prong of the two-
prong mixed-motive test. Employers who cannot satisfy the second prong
are subject to back pay, reinstatement, punitive and compensatory damages,
as well as cost and fees.
As with most statutes or amendments, the CRA of 1991 contained
statutory gaps. The two gaps that affected the mixed-motive instruction and
89. Id.
90. Id. at 521.
91. See Robin Pogrebin & Edward Klaris, The Rules of the Game, L. SCH., Autumn 2006,
at 25, 34.
[Ariz. St. L.J.914
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the burden of proof can be presented in two questions: (1) do Justice
O'Connor's substantial factor and direct evidence standards still apply? and
(2) do the amendments apply to the ADEA, the ADA, and retaliation cases?
It took the Supreme Court twelve years to answer the former 92 and
seventeen years to partially answer the latter.93 Plaintiffs cheered the first
ruling94 while employers exhaled a sigh of relief after the second. 95
In Costa, the Court provided a simple answer to a simple question. The
question was: does the CRA of 1991 require plaintiffs to provide direct
evidence that discrimination was a substantial factor in the employer's
decision to receive a mixed-motive instruction? The Court concluded no.
Both the majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurrence state that the
only conclusion to be drawn from Congress's replacement of the term
substantial with motivating, and its failure to even mention direct evidence,
is that any evidence that discrimination motivated the employer is enough to
warrant a mixed-motive instruction. Along with allowing the mixed-
motive instruction to be applied to a significant number of cases, Costa
destroyed the employment discrimination litigation framework. Now,
pretext cases were limited to where there was no evidence. As stated above,
however, because plaintiff lawyers should be reluctant to take these orphan
cases, it seemed that all cases became mixed-motive cases.9 7
92. Desert Palace, Inc., v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (holding that there was no need for
direct evidence in order to obtain the mixed-motive instruction).
93. Gross deals with the ADEA only, but it seems logical that the Court should follow it in
ADA cases.
94. See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roil ": An Essay on the Quiet
Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 71, 79 (2003) ("[T]he
quiet little revolution started in Costa will be one of the most significant advances for civil
rights enforcement in the twenty-first century.").
95. See David G. Savage, Age Bias Much Harder To Prove: The Supreme Court Shifts the
Burden of Proof to the Worker Making the Claim. Businesses Cheer, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2009,
at Al (noting that "[b]usinesses applauded" the Court's decision in Gross); see also Leigh A.
Van Ostrand, Note, A Close Look at ADEA Mixed-Motives Claims and Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc., 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 399 (2009).
96. See Costa, 539 U.S. at 102.
97. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII
Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REv. 83, 102-03 (2004); Kenneth R. Davis, Price-
Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 861 (2004).
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A. Are All Cases Mixed-Motive Cases?
After Costa, a number of scholars and court decisions proclaimed the
death of McDonnell Douglas.9" Reports of McDonnell Douglas's death,
however, were greatly exaggerated. In fact, in the six-month period between
December of 2006 and May of 2007, courts used the McDonnell Douglas
framework in over 400 cases. 99 Moreover, courts in every federal circuit
used the McDonnell Douglas framework in 2008-2009. °o Thus, the
interesting question is not whether McDonnell Douglas did survive Costa-
it did-but rather, should it have?
The relevance of McDonnell Douglas after Costa has been hotly debated
in courts and numerous law review articles.0" The debate is heated and
complex because the schemes are not the result of any thoughtful coherent
policy. Instead, they arise out of layered case law analyzing Title VII, the
CRA of 1991, and the other discrimination statutes. There has never been
98. For insight into the debate, see William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003:
May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 212-13 (2003) and Michael J.
Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell
Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887 (2004).
99. See Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate
Treatment Law: McDonnell Douglas's Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AM. Bus.
L.J. 511, 538 n.142 (2008).
100. Our very broad search terms consisted of: "McDonnell Douglas and Title VII or ADA
or ADEA and discrimination." We then read cases from each circuit to confirm that all circuits
used the pretext standard in the time period in question. According to this research, the only
circuit which has not cited the McDonnell Douglas framework since Costa is the Federal
Circuit. See, e.g., EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir. 2009) (the
ADA); Reeves v. DSI Sec. Servs., 331 F. App'x 659, 662 (lth Cir. 2009) (Title VII);
Hendricks v. Geithner, 568 F.3d 1008, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Title VII); Flax v. Delaware, 329
F. App'x 360, 363-64 (3d Cir. 2009) (Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA); Cunningham v.
N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 326 F. App'x 617, 618-19 (2d Cir. 2009) (Title VII); Nealey v.
Water Dist. No. 1, 324 F. App'x 744, 748 (10th Cir. 2009) (the ADA and the ADEA); Gerving
v. Opbiz, L.L.C., 324 F. App'x 692, 694-95 (9th Cir. 2009) (Title VII); Antonetti v. Abbott
Labs., 563 F.3d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 2009) (Title VII); Sybrandt v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 560
F.3d 553, 557-58 (6th Cir. 2009) (Title VII); Johnson v. Mechs. & Farmers Bank, 309 F. App'x
675, 682 (4th Cir. 2009) (the ADEA); Qamhiya v. Iowa State Univ. of Sci. & Tech., 566 F.3d
733, 746 (8th Cir. 2008) (Title VII); Sabinson v. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 542 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
2008) (Title VII and the ADEA); Haddon v. Exec. Residence at the White House, 313 F.3d
1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (using the Title VII rationale to apply McDonnell Douglas to an
analogous statutory discrimination claim; this is the most recent citation of McDonnell Douglas
in the Federal Circuit).
101. To appreciate the current debate, see Herawi v. Alabama Department of Forensic
Sciences, 311 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1345 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (arguing the purported demise of
McDonnell Douglas is overblown) and Matthew R. Scott & Russell D. Chapman, Much Ado
About Nothing-Why Desert Palace Neither Murdered McDonnell Douglas nor Transformed All
Employment Discrimination Cases to Mixed-Motive, 36 ST. MARY'S L.J. 395, 405 (2005)
("[N]othing in Desert Palace hints at the death or even wounding of McDonnell Douglas.").
[Ariz. St. L.J.916
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Congressional action addressing the issue or a Supreme Court opinion
deciding whether the two systems can still co-exist. Indeed, Congress in the
CRA of 1991 and the Court in Costa declined to address the issue. The
enduring circuit split regarding how courts operationalize McDonnell
Douglas only fuels further confusion.
Prior to Price Waterhouse, all circuits used the McDonnell Douglas
scheme in summary judgment motions. 12 A number of circuits, however,
held that McDonnell Douglas is no longer relevant once the case gets to
trial. ' 3 These circuits constructed, and often still use, jury instructions that
do not address the prima facie case, the articulation of non-discriminatory
reason, and the concept of pretext. 104 Instead, the jury instruction simply
asks the jurors to decide if the employer made its decision "because of' the
protected class.' 05 In other jurisdictions, in contrast, jury instructions include
the entire scheme. 10 6 Conversely, the mixed-motive scheme is a jury
102. See Kristina N. Klein, Note, Oasis or Mirage? Desert Palace and Its Impact on the
Summary Judgment Landscape, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1177, 1186-87 (2006) (discussing
McDonnell Douglas in the context of summary judgment).
103. See Sperino, supra note 5, at 376-78 (chronicling the case law of the circuits in great
detail).
104. See Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 997-98 (10th Cir. 2005);
Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 2004); Sanders v. N.Y. City
Human Res. Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 758 (2d Cir. 2004); Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d
532, 539-40 (9th Cir. 2003); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322 (1 lth Cir.
1999) ("We stress that it is unnecessary and inappropriate to instruct the jury on the McDonnell
Douglas analysis."); Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994); Mullen v.
Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1137 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that the
"shifting burdens of production of Burdine ... are beyond the function and expertise of the
jury" as well as "overly complex").
105. See Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding
that it is improper to instruct the jury on the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting scheme, but
proper "to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to
establish the prima facie case have been shown"); Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119,
127 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Instructing the jury on the elements of a prima facie case, presumptions,
and the shifting burden of proof is unnecessary and confusing. Instead, the court should instruct
the jury to consider the ultimate question of whether defendant terminated plaintiff because of
his age.").
106. See Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 167 & n.9 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that it
was proper to "guid[e] the jury through a three-stage order of proof as opposed to instructing...
solely on the ultimate issue of sex discrimination"); see also Brown v. Packaging Corp. of Am.,
338 F.3d 586, 595-96 (6th Cir. 2003); Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1425 &
n.3 (10th Cir. 1993); Lynch v. Belden & Co., 882 F.2d 262, 269 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[I]t was
proper for the district court to instruct the jury as to the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine formula
for evaluating indirect evidence."); Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 200 (1st
Cir. 1987) ("[T]he district court was correct in using the [McDonnell Douglas] framework in the
instructions to the jury.").
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instruction.1 °7 After Costa, however, some courts used the mixed-motive
scheme in summary judgments while others refused to do so.'0 8 Thus, our
analysis considers two discrete, though related, aspects: (1) summary
judgment motions and (2) trials.
B. Summary Judgment Motions
The Sixth Circuit held that McDonnell Douglas does not apply to mixed-
motive cases and thus, to survive summary judgment motions, plaintiffs
need only prove that they suffered an adverse employment action and that
membership in a protected class motivated the employers' action.0 9 The
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits concluded that McDonnell Douglas applies to
the summary judgment analysis of mixed-motive claims after Costa. "0 The
Fifth Circuit adopted what the Baxter court referred to as a "modified
McDonnell Douglas" approach. Under this approach, plaintiffs in mixed-
motive cases can rebut the defendant's legitimate non-discriminatory reason
through evidence of pretext (the traditional McDonnell Douglas), and/or
with evidence that the defendant's proffered reason is only one of the
reasons for its conduct (the mixed-motive alternative). "' The Second
Circuit seemingly followed this analysis as well. 2
107. See Donovan v. Milk Mktg. Inc., 243 F.3d 584, 585-86 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[W]hen the
jury might reasonably conclude on the evidence that both illegal discrimination and legitimate
non-discriminatory reasons were present in an employer's decisionmaking process, the court
may charge the jury on mixed-motivation in accordance with Price Waterhouse.").
108. See generally Kerry S. Acocella, Note, Out with the Old and In with the New: The
Second Circuit Shows It's Time for the Supreme Court to Finally Overrule McDonnell Douglas,
11 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 125 (2004).
109. See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400 (6th Cir. 2008).
110. See Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e conclude
that Desert Palace had no impact on prior Eighth Circuit summary judgment decisions."); see
also Burstein v. Emtel, Inc., 137 F. App'x 205, 209 n.8 (11th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that the
McDonnell Douglas analysis continues to apply in mixed-motive cases without modification
post-Desert Palace); Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (rejecting an
argument that "the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.., was radically revised by the
Supreme Court in Desert Palace" and noting that "after Desert Palace was decided, this Court
has continued to apply the McDonnell Douglas analysis in non-mixed-motive cases").
111. See Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 2005); Rachid v. Jack
in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).
112. The Second Circuit appears to follow the "modified McDonnell Douglas" approach,
though they do not state so explicitly. See Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 141-42 (2d Cir.
2008) ("[A] plaintiff who, like Holcomb, claims that the employer acted with mixed motives is
not required to prove that the employer's stated reason was a pretext. A plaintiff alleging that an
employment decision was motivated both by legitimate and illegitimate reasons may establish
that the impermissible factor was a motivating factor, without proving that the employer's
918 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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In contrast, the Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits offer employee plaintiffs
the choice to defend against a defendant's motion for summary judgment by
proceeding under either the McDonnell Douglas scheme or by "presenting
direct or circumstantial evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether an impermissible factor such as race motivated [at least in
part] the ... adverse employment decision."1"3 The First, Third, and Tenth
Circuits have addressed the issue, but have not established a coherent
rule," 4 while the Seventh Circuit appears to have not yet considered this
issue. 15
C. Trials
As stated above, a split exists among the circuits as to whether the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme should be part of jury
instructions. A majority of circuits do not include burden shifting in the
instructions because McDonnell Douglas is viewed as too complex and
confusing for the jury.116 Instead, these circuits simply ask the jury if an
proffered explanation was not some part of the employer's motivation.") (emphasis omitted)
(internal quotations omitted).
113. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005); see
McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that a mixed-
motive plaintiff "may proceed using the McDonnell Douglas framework, or alternatively, may
simply produce direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason
more likely than not motivated" the employment decision); Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics
Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2004). The D.C. Circuit appears to have recently
joined this middle ground approach. See Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447, 451 & n.* (D.C. Cir.
2007) (indicating that "a plaintiff can establish an unlawful employment practice by showing
that 'discrimination or retaliation played a "motivating part" or was a "substantial factor" in the
employment decision"' but noting that a "plaintiff may also, of course, use evidence of pretext
and the McDonnell Douglas framework to prove a mixed-motive case").
114. See Houser v. Carpenter Tech. Corp., 216 F. App'x 263, 265 (3d Cir. 2007) (refusing
to decide the issue because the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to survive
summary judgment under any mixed-motive standard); Furaus v. Citadel Commc'ns Corp., 168
F. App'x 257, 260 (10th Cir. 2006) (refusing to decide the issue because the plaintiff failed to
properly preserve the argument for appeal); Rodriguez v. Sears Roebuck de P.R., Inc., 432 F.3d
379, 380-81 (1st Cir. 2005); Hillstrom v. Best W. TLC Hotel, 354 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2003).
115. We could not find cases discussing this issue in the Seventh Circuit.
116. Whittington v. Nordam Group, Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 997-98 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting
that the court has disapproved using McDonnell Douglas because the jury is not well equipped
to understand the burden shifting); Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d 532, 540 (9th Cir.
2003) ("[I]t is error to charge the jury with the elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case."); Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 221 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that,
although it is proper "to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates
necessary to establish the prima facie case have been shown," it is error to instruct the jury on
the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting scheme); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d
1317, 1322 (1 1th Cir. 1999) ("[I]t is unnecessary and inappropriate to instruct the jury on the
919
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employer acted because of an employee's status as a member of a protected
class. The First and Second Circuits take more of a middle ground approach
by acknowledging that McDonnell Douglas is confusing but relevant to the
jury. "7 The Sixth Circuit, however, holds that McDonnell Douglas is
properly included in jury instructions. 1 8
D. Where To Go From Here?
Whether McDonnell Douglas should survive Costa is beyond the scope
of this Article. After all, numerous scholars have already addressed this
question.1 9 Also, and more importantly, courts, at least for now, have
McDonnell Douglas analysis."); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 849-50 (8th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (Loken, J., in Part II.A of the dissent, which a majority of the court joined) (holding that
"the jury need only decide the ultimate issue of intentional age discrimination," and usually
need not make findings on the prima facie case or whether the defendant's explanation is
pretextual); Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Once the judge finds that
the plaintiff has made the minimum necessary demonstration (the 'prima facie case') and that
the defendant has produced an age-neutral explanation, the burden-shifting apparatus has served
its purpose, and the only remaining question-the only question the jury need answer-is
whether the plaintiff is a victim of intentional discrimination.") (emphasis omitted); Walther v.
Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Instructing the jury on the elements of a
prima facie case, presumptions, and the shifting burden of proof is unnecessary and confusing.
Instead, the court should instruct the jury to consider the ultimate question of whether defendant
terminated plaintiff because of his age."); Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d
1130, 1137 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that the "shifting burdens of production of Burdine ... are
beyond the function and expertise of the jury" and are "overly complex").
117. Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that, although a
jury instruction that included the phrase "prima facie case" and referred to "defendants'
'burden' of produc[tion] ... created a distinct risk of confusing the jury," in certain instances it
would be appropriate to instruct the jury on the elements of a prima facie case); Loeb v.
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979) ("McDonnell Douglas was not written as a
prospective jury charge; to read its technical aspects to a jury, as was done here, will add little to
the jury's understanding of the case ...."). But see Lynch v. Belden & Co., 882 F.2d 262, 269
(7th Cir. 1989) ("[I]t was proper for the district court to instruct the jury as to the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine formula for evaluating indirect evidence.... [Such an instruction] accurately
informed the jury of the parties' burdens ....") (citation omitted); Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 200 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[T]he district court was correct in using the framework
in the instructions to the jury" because "[i]t is a straightforward way of explaining how to
consider whether there is intentional discrimination."), abrogated on other grounds by
lacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 27 (1st Cir. 1999).
118. Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 167 & n.9 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that it was
not error to "guid[e] the jury through a three-stage order of proof as opposed to instructing...
solely on the ultimate issue of sex discrimination").
119. E.g., Christopher R. Hedican et al., McDonnell Douglas: Alive and Well, 52 DRAKE L.
REv. 383, 395-402, 425 (2004) (defending McDonnell Douglas as "a fair and appropriate way
to ferret out discrimination"); Steven J. Kaminshine, Disparate Treatment as a Theory of
Discrimination: The Need for a Restatement, Not a Revolution, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 38-62
(2005) (arguing for the retention of the McDonnell Douglas framework as one possible method
920 [A-riz. St. L.J.
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spoken by continuing to apply McDonnell Douglas.120 Thus, even if the
mixed-motive instruction were available in all cases, it would not always be
used. Finally, this Article seeks only to assess whether jury instructions do,
in fact, matter. Although we leave the normative aspects of this question to
others, two points warrant mention. First, we argue that regardless of the
scheme used, it is simply naive to separate cases into so-called single or
mixed-motive cases. Second, Gross strikes us as incorrect-all
discrimination statutes should follow the same scheme.
References to Price Waterhouse as a "mixed-motive" case imply that
McDonnell Douglas cases are "single-motive" cases. This distinction makes
little sense.' First, absent certain reprehensible behavior, such as
workplace violence, it is illogical to think that sophisticated business
decision makers hire, fire, promote, or demote people for any individual
reason. Instead, human resource departments have multi-step procedures to
make such decisions. It is increasingly hard to believe that in a multi-
cultural society forty-five years after Title VII, numerous employers base a
business decision exclusively on whether an employee simply belongs to a
protected class. Where such a case arises, it would surely trigger quick
litigation (and, likely, quick settlement). Moreover, that the majority of
discrimination cases are discharge cases makes the single-motive argument
even less persuasive. A terminated employee was initially hired by the
company. Unless there was a change in decision-making personnel, this
suggests that the employer was neither racist nor sexist at the point of
hiring, but became so by the time a termination decision was implemented.
Are most employment discrimination cases mixed-motive cases?
Probably. Employers typically rely on numerous factors in the employment
context, many legitimate and, unfortunately, some unlawful. 2 2 There is
another reason to argue against the bifurcated single-motive versus mixed-
motive label. Currently, judges decide what type of case it is before the case
for plaintiffs to present proof of disparate treatment); Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell
Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 109, 110 (2007) ("I come to defend McDonnell Douglas...
."); Zimmer, supra note 98, at 1933 (arguing that McDonnell Douglas should continue to play a
limited role in disparate treatment cases because its "process of elimination is a fundamentally
sound way of persuading the factfinder that discrimination was involved in the [defendant's]
decision").
120. See supra notes 99-100.
121. See Katz, supra note 119, at 150 n.142.
122. See, e.g., Michael I. Norton et al., Mixed Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of
Legitimate and Illegitimate Criteria on Decision Making, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 36, 47
(2006) (finding that decision makers unconsciously rely on racial information in their decisions
but mask its influence by inflating the value of non-racial justifications).
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goes to the jury. We contend that whether the case is a single-motive case
(assuming this is possible) or mixed-motive case is a question for the jury.
In typical discrimination cases, employees argue that they were
terminated for unlawful reasons. Conversely, employers argue that
legitimate business factors motivated their decisions. In such cases, at least
three scenarios are possible. First, the employee is correct; unlawful reasons
motivated the employer's decisions. Second, the employer is correct;
legitimate business factors explain its actions. Third, legitimate and
illegitimate factors motivated the employer.
We contend that determining which of the three scenarios best fits the
facts is the job of the fact finder-not the judge. In fact, as the Fifth Circuit
stated in Smith v. Xerox,'23 having the court "label" the case before trial is
unnecessary.' 1 The Smith court, citing Costa, stated that all plaintiffs
should prefer the mixed-motive instruction and held that the court should
allow this instruction if there is enough evidence to allow a fact finder to
infer that the employer was motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate
reasons.'25 The Smith court gave the mixed-motive instruction because the
plaintiff presented evidence of discrimination and the employer presented
evidenc of a legitimate reason for its decision.'26 While the Smith court's
analysis makes sense, we contend it is almost always a waste of time. As a
practical matter, cases simply do not reach the trial stage if the employee
has nothing to support the claim and if the employer has not provided a
legitimate reason for its decision. Thus, courts in such cases should provide
a mixed-motive instruction.
Labeling a case as "mixed-motive," however, presupposes the holding of
the jury. Accordingly, the jury instruction should be referred to as the
motivating factor instruction (and for the remainder of this Article we will
refer to it as such). Because it is the jury's role to determine whether the
evidence presented by each side is credible, it is clear that all discrimination
cases should follow the same rubric and all juries should be given the same
type of instruction in order to decide the employers' motivations. Ideally,
the law should then clearly state whether any unlawful motivation is
permitted. Thus, Title VII should either prohibit all actions motivated by a
protected class or it should prohibit all decisions made "because of the
protected class." Some scholars and judges argue that providing the full
McDonnell Douglas scheme is the proper instruction for determining
123. 602 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2010).
124. Id. at 333.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 333-34.
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discrimination. 12 7 Others, in contrast, claim the motivating factor instruction
is the best method. 128 Still others argue that the standard should be a simple
"but for" or "because of' instruction. 129 For those who take such a position,
either the McDonnell Douglas or the original Price Waterhouse scheme will
suffice. While we could argue the merits of each, we could also agree with
any of these scholars. The salient point, however, is that the same standard
should apply in all employment cases. To this end, the Supreme Court took
a large step backwards in Gross.
E. Gross is Illogical
In Gross, the Court held that the CRA of 1991 did not apply to the
ADEA (and seemingly the ADA and retaliation). 30 The Gross holding is
interesting for a number of reasons. First, it was a radical departure for the
Court to hold that there were different standards of proof for the ADEA and
Title VII. Second, it seems odd to hold that a statute that originally had
more teeth than Title VII now has fewer. Finally, the Court's reasoning
confuses more than persuades.
Prior to, and after, the CRA of 1991, courts routinely applied the same
burden shifting analysis in ADEA and Title VII claims. '' Moreover, the
two statutes were typically treated similarly except when it came to
damages. A line of cases dealing with pre-dispute mandatory arbitration
127. See Davis, supra note 97, at 901.
128. Corbett, supra note 98, at 199-200; Davis, supra note 97, at 861; T.L. Nagy, The Fall
of the False Dichotomy: The Effect of Desert Palace v. Costa on Summary Judgment in Title VII
Discrimination Cases, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 137, 156-57 (2004); Van Detta, supra note 94, at 76.
129. See Whittington v. Nordam Group, Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 996-97 (10th Cir. 2005);
Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d 532, 539-40 (9th Cir. 2003); Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp.
Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 222 (3d Cir. 2000); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322
(11 th Cir. 1999); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 845 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Gehring v.
Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994); Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, 125
(5th Cir. 1992); Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1137 (4th Cir.
1988).
130. See Smith, 602 F.3d at 329 (where the employee argued that Gross should be applied
to retaliation cases); Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 148-49 (2d Cir. 2010).
131. See Prenkert supra note 99, at 547-48 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973)). The McDonnell Douglas framework is often used to prove and to evaluate the
evidence in cases claiming disparate treatment employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1994), as well as the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621a-621b (1999), and the
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101a-12101b (1995). See,
e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003) (analyzing an ADA claim using the
McDonnell Douglas framework); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
142 (2000) (assuming, but not holding, that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies in
ADEA cases); O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996) (same).
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illustrates this. The first Supreme Court case dealing with this, Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., a race case, held that a union arbitration agreement
did not preclude an employee from litigating. 132  Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., a non-union age case, distinguished
Alexander because of the union/non-union difference, not age versus
race.'33 The next four cases, all involving Circuit City as the employer, were
Title VII cases.134 All relied on Gilmer and none mentioned a statute-based
distinction. Still, despite more than forty years of similar treatment, the
Gross Court found that Title VII and the ADEA warranted different
treatment.
In defense of the Court, Congress did not amend the ADEA in the CRA
of 1991. Thus, Congress placed the Court in the awkward position of
having to decide whether to: (1) apply a statute (the CRA of 1991) that does
not address the ADEA; (2) apply a case, Price Waterhouse, that Congress
amended because it was dissatisfied with the result; or (3) develop a third
method for dealing with mixed-motive cases.
The Court pursued the third option and held that the burden-shifting
framework set forth in Price Waterhouse, made more employee-friendly in
the CRA of 1991, does not apply to the ADEA.'35 Thus, there is no such
thing as a mixed-motive or motivating factor age discrimination case. The
Court's analysis is difficult to follow. First, in the short period after Price
Waterhouse and before the CRA of 1991, courts routinely applied the case
to the ADEA.'36 After the CRA of 1991, courts were split as to whether
plaintiffs were entitled to costs and fees when the jury found that age was a
motivating factor, but the decision would have been made regardless of
age. 13 7 After Costa, courts split on whether age plaintiffs still needed to
provide direct evidence in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction.'38
Indeed, that was the issue that the Court granted certiorari on in Gross.
132. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
133. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991).
134. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 110 (2001); Morrison v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 675 (6th Cir. 2003); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283
F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002); Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 682-83 (8th
Cir. 2001).
135. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009).
136. See, e.g., Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 933 F.2d 187, 191-92 (2d Cir. 1991);
Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1146 (5th Cir. 1991).
137. See generally Nancy L. Lane, After Price Waterhouse and the Civil Rights Act of
1991: Providing Attorney's Fees to Plaintiffs in Mixed Motive Age Discrimination Cases, 3
ELDER L.J. 341 (1995).
138. Compare Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 744-45 (4th Cir. 2006), with EEOC v.
Warfield-Rohr Casket Co., 364 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 2004).
924 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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The splits made sense. Congress amended Price Waterhouse in the CRA
of 1991 to make the mixed-motive more employee-friendly. As Judge
Pooler noted, however, it would take a lot of "chutzpah" to apply the CRA
of 1991 to an age case when Congress did not amend the statute. 3 9 In
Gross, the Court turned away from years of applying the same scheme to all
discrimination cases and ignored Price Waterhouse's rationale. Instead, the
Court cited two "pretext cases," Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc.140 and O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,'4' for the
propositions that: (1) in age cases the term discrimination means "because
of' while in Title VII motivation it means unlawful, and (2) the burden of
proof in age cases always remains with the plaintiff. 142 Thus, the Gross
Court rejected the motivating factor standard (set forth in Price Waterhouse,
as amended by the CRA of 1991) because, it held, the ADEA requires "but
for" cause.' 43
The Court in Gross justified its holding by examining the following
ADEA language: "[i/t shall be unlawful for an employer .. . to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.'' 144 The
Court, citing well established statutory construction guidelines, concluded
that the plain language made it clear that the plaintiff bore the burden of
proof at all times and that any burden shifting set forth in Price Waterhouse
and in the CRA was inapposite to the ADEA's plain language. 14 As the
dissent properly acknowledged, however, the ADEA's language is identical
to that in Title VII, the basis of the motivating factor instruction.'46 The
ADA has identical language as well. 14 Accordingly, the Gross Court
distinguished the ADEA from Title VII by holding that identical language
must, as a matter of law, have different judicial meanings. 148
Regardless of our analysis, Justice Thomas's opinion in Gross holds that
to prove an ADEA violation, a plaintiff must prove that age was the so-
139. Judge Pooler made this statement to Professor Sherwyn during a jury instruction
discussion when he argued that the CRA of 1991's mixed-motive language should apply in the
ADEA case Austin v. Cornell University, 891 F. Supp. 740 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
140. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
141. 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
142. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009).
143. Id. at 2351.
144. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2008) (emphasis added).
145. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
146. Id. at 2353-54.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2008).
148. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
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called "but-for" reason for the discrimination. In addition, Gross holds that
the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff throughout the case. In
contrast, Title VII plaintiffs need only prove that the protected class at issue
was a motivating factor in order to obtain a declaratory judgment and earn
costs and fees. Moreover, to avoid back pay, reinstatement, and punitive
and compensatory damages, Title VII employers must prove that they
would have made the decision regardless of the protected class. While
reasonable minds can (and do) differ on whether Gross was correctly
decided or reasoned, it is plain that the Court created different standards for
Title VII cases and non-Title VII discrimination cases. The question we
now turn to is whether such a distinction matters.
II. DOES THE BURDEN OF PROOF MATTER? EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
Do employees fare better at trial with a mixed-motive instruction than
with a pretext instruction? If so, one would expect that the granting of a
mixed-motive instruction would lead to quicker and higher settlements. Is
that the case?
Our inability to answer these questions with certainty flows from general
methodological limits, as well as problems specific to jury instruction
research. First, selection bias lurks as not all cases are reported,'49 and the
sample of those cases that are reported is not random.'50 Second, most cases
settle and most settlements are confidential.' Third, even if all
employment discrimination lawsuits went to trial (and did not settle) and
generated published opinions, factual and legal variations across cases
complicate efforts to extract general rules to guide litigants. Fourth, specific
issues investigated by this study confront additional hurdles. Summary
judgment motions, by definition, do not address jury instructions because
they are pre-trial motions. Appellate cases are only relevant if the jury
instruction is the issue being examined (a small percentage of appeals).
149. See Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 246 (2001) ("The most important caveat that emerges from these
[methodological] considerations is that appellate investigations in the employment
discrimination area reflect a selection bias.").
150. For example, the U.S. Courts of Appeals publish opinions only selectively, and the
circuits follow different rules regarding unpublished opinions. Cotker, supra note 18, at 104-05
(noting the problems of statistical representation inherent in empirical analysis of appellate
court decisions); see also Colker, supra note 149, at 244-45.
151. The few exceptions include settlement agreements for class actions, for claims filed by
a governmental plaintiff, such as the EEOC, and, in some states, for claims against a
governmental defendant regarding public records. See Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A
New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REv. 867, 869 (2007).
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Finally, published results from jury trials are often not a helpful source of
data as jury instructions are typically unavailable, making it difficult to
know whether the case was a mixed-motive case or not.
A. Mock Jury Studies
We selected an experimental research design, specifically, a mock jury
experiment, as the best option to address these important methodological
challenges. Although mock jury studies are increasingly common in legal
scholarship, the method warrants brief discussion. Mock jury studies seek to
leverage the benefits of experimental research (such as manipulating key
independent variables) and correlation research while minimizing some of
the methodology's weaknesses.' 52 In his review of mock jury research,
Professor Saks identified a variety of issues where mock jury experiments
were instrumental-juror characteristics, the effects of prejudicial pretrial
news coverage, the use of impermissible information, jurors' ability to
understand standards of proof and instructions on the law, and deliberation
phenomena, to name a few.153 Two experiments will be examined in brief
detail to illustrate the process.
Mock jury experiments have aided researchers investigating the role of
race in jury decision-making. A 2001 mock jury experiment examined the
effect of racially-charged facts on white jurors' biases in a criminal battery
case. 1 4 Researchers randomly distributed packets containing a trial
summary, judicial instructions, and a questionnaire to white participants in
an airport waiting area.155 Half of the summaries involved a white defendant
and half involved a black defendant.' 56 Additionally, half contained racially-
charged factual circumstances; in the other half, there was no racial
tension.'57 On the questionnaire, subjects rendered a verdict, recommended
a sentence, and rated the strength of the prosecution's and defendant's
152. See generally David De Cremer & Daan Van Knipperberg, How Do Leaders Promote
Cooperation? The Effects of Charisma and Procedural Fairness, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 858
(2002).
153. Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make
Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 9-44 (1997).
154. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias. An Investigation of
Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
201, 214-15 (2001).
155. Id. at 216.
156. Id.
157. In the racially-charged version, the defendant was one of only two of his race on a
basketball team and had suffered racial remarks and unfair criticism by teammates. The race-
neutral version did not mention racial tension. However, all summaries identified the
defendant's race in a demographic information section. Id.
927
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cases. "'58 Statistical analyses showed that in race-neutral cases, white jurors
more readily display anti-black bias than in racially-charged cases.159 The
authors hypothesized that the presence of race issues prompts jurors to
conceal prejudice. 160
Researchers have frequently turned to mock jury experiments to
investigate jurors' ability to disregard inadmissible evidence. A seminal
mock jury study, part of the University of Chicago jury project, examined
damage awards for a fictional auto-accident case."' Participants in three
groups listened to tape-recorded mock trials.'62 In the first group's
recording, the defendant revealed he had no insurance, to no objection; in
the second, the defendant revealed he had insurance, to no objection; and in
the third, the defendant revealed he had insurance, counsel objected, and the
court directed the jury to disregard. 63 The average awards were $33,000,
$37,000, and $46,000 for the three groups, respectively.164 The study
concluded that the "fuss" over the defendant's coverage sensitized jurors to
that fact and resulted in higher damage awards. 
65
Mock jury experiments provide a significant advantage over post-trial
jury interviews and trial outcome quantitative analyses. Notably, the ability
to change one variable at a time allows researchers to gain a clearer
understanding of relations among key variables. 66 Nonetheless, the
approach is not without limitations. Standard problems include that: (1)
mock jurors are often students rather than a more representative population
sample; (2) facts are presented in writing or by video or audio recording
rather than through live trial; (3) verdicts lack real-world consequences, and
most often; (4) group deliberation is absent. 167
The degree of threat posed by student mock jurors is unclear. For
example, studies examining the use of students have found "little or no
difference in ... verdicts by student and adult jury-eligible respondents for
158. Id. at 217.
159. Id. at 220.
160. Id.
161. See Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744,
753 (1959).
162. Id. at 753-54.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 754.
165. Id.
166. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know
About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 997, 1002 (2003).
167. See Saks, supra note 153, at 7.
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the same cases."' 68 A meta-analysis of twenty years of jury simulations
found no conclusive difference between student and non-student
participants.169 Where the infrequent differences arose, students presented a
slight preference against criminal conviction and for defendant civilliability. "°
Although the absence of real-world consequences in mock jury
experiments certainly limits external validity, results from studies of how
actual and mock jury study findings differ are mixed.17' For example, of the
five studies indicated in Bornstein and McCabe, one study found the
absence of real-life consequences increased conviction rates, another study
found the opposite effect, and the remaining three found no main effect at
all. '72  Regardless, difficulties associated with studying-let alone
manipulating-jury behavior make access to such data not readily feasible.
The absence of group deliberations poses an important threat, however.
Field work examined by a 2001 meta-analysis suggests that in one of every
ten trials, a jury majority will change post-deliberation.'73 Deliberation
comes at a cost, however: it requires more time and reduces sample size to
one verdict for every six, eight, or twelve subjects, resulting in greater
expense per data point. Altogether, mock jury experiments are a "necessary
first step in designing more expensive and elaborate studies that examine
deliberation."' 17
4
B. Jury Instructions
In an effort to enhance external validity in our experiment, we used case
statements constructed (and used) by experienced employment
discrimination specialists at a leading New York City law firm.'75 Before
168. Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 Sci. 1046,
1046 (1989).
169. Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out?,
23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75, 79-80 (1999).
170. Id. at 80.
171. See Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of
Consequentiality in Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 443,452 (2005).
172. Id.
173. Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622, 701 (2001).
174. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 154, at 224.
175. Founded in 1875, Proskauer, Rose LLP is a full service law firm with offices in New
York, New Jersey, Florida, Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, New Orleans, Washington D.C., and
throughout the world. Proskauer: About Us, http://www.proskauer.com/about/ (last visited Sept.
9,2010).
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describing our experimental design, however, we first describe the jury
instructions and special verdict sheets used in our study.
One problem with studying jury instructions is that judges may fashion
their own specific jury instructions, as long as they accord with settled law.
To that end, judges will ask each party to draft proposed jury instructions
and will either choose one of the two proposals or draft a third to use.
Conversely, some jurisdictions have established model jury instructions that
are used in the vast majority of cases. 17 6 These instructions are accompanied
by what are referred to as "special jury verdict sheets." At the time we
started our study, the summer of 2004, the Northern District of Illinois had
made sample discrimination jury instructions and special verdict sheets
publicly available. These jury instructions and special verdict sheets, which
we used in our study, are presented in the Appendix. 177
To the untrained ear, the difference between the two instructions may
seem minimal. If Price Waterhouse were the only standard, any difference
would be largely meaningless. The jury could find that the protected class
motivated the employer, but that the employer would have made the same
decision regardless of the protected class. Before the CRA of 1991, such a
holding would have represented a complete victory for the employer. The
CRA of 1991, however, changed the legal terrain in a crucial way. After
1991, the employee wins costs and attorney fees with such a holding. Thus,
jurors who believe that race, color, sex, national origin, religion, age, and
disability always motivate decisions, but also believe that the employer
would have made the same decision regardless of the protected class, may
unwittingly award the plaintiff costs and fees even if they believe the case is
frivolous and not worthy of any award. Most lay jurors (including the
176. See, e.g., Lopez v. Mendez, 432 F.3d 829, 835 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding no error in the
trial court's determination that an applicable Arkansas Model Jury Instruction stated Arkansas
law correctly); Gatlin v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 481 S.W.2d 338, 340-41 (Ark. 1972)
(finding error where the trial court substituted its own instruction for an applicable Arkansas
Model Jury Instruction without stating the basis for refusal); Irwin v. Omar Bakeries, Inc., 198
N.E.2d 700, 704-05 (I11. App. Ct. 1964) (finding no error where the trial court did not use a
specific Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction that the court determined was inapplicable); Means v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 S.W.2d 780, 786 (Mo. 1977) (finding no error where the trial court
modified the Missouri Approved Jury Instruction to apply it to the case facts); Anderson v.
Welsh, 527 P.2d 1079, 1086-87 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) (finding non-prejudicial error where the
trial court gave not only the applicable Uniform Jury Instruction but additional inapplicable
Uniform Jury Instructions).
177. FED. CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR., § 3.01 & cmt. c (Comm. on
Pattern Civ. Jury Instructions of the Seventh Cir., Draft, Oct. 2004), available at
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Rules/pjurycivil-draft.pdf.
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college students in our study) have no reason to understand or even be
aware of this difference,178 and this infuriates many management lawyers.
Management litigators have long complained that jurors might be
inclined to "split the baby" and hold that the protected class did motivate
the employer, but that the employer would have made the same decision
regardless of the protected class status. 179 As stated above, such jurors
would likely have no idea that they had just awarded costs and fees to the
plaintiff. Even more troubling to management attorneys is that in many
employment discrimination cases, costs and fees associated with defending
employment discrimination cases can easily exceed the back pay damages
that a prevailing employee would receive."'
Experienced and nuanced management litigators seek to reduce this
problem by deleting the second prong of the mixed-motive instruction.
Asking an employer to prove that it would have made its decision
regardless of the protected class is relevant only if the jury finds that the
protected class motivated the employer. A jury finding that improper
motivation existed when it had another chance to find for the employer (i.e.,
the second prong) may otherwise not find motivation if that were the only
question asked and if the finding of "yes" equaled damages. Because the
second prong involves an employer's affirmative defense, however, an
employer can choose whether to present it.
C. The Experiment
In our experiment, experienced litigators were videotaped delivering
case statements regarding a situation where a plaintiff alleged he was not
promoted because of his national origin. We then taped another litigator
delivering three different jury instruction scenarios: (1) the pretext scenario;
(2) the motivating factor scenario with the employer's affirmative defense;
and (3) the motivating factor scenario without the employer's affirmative
defense. Cornell University undergraduate students (N = 551) served as
178. Neither the instructions on law nor the special verdict sheets notify the jury that
finding for the plaintiff with respect to the first prong grants costs and attorney fees even if the
jury finds for the defendant with respect to the second.
179. For example, Joe Baumgarten, Proskauer, Rose, Gregg Gilman, Davis & Gilbert,
Carolyn Richmond, Fox, Rothschild, and Paul Wagner, Stokes Roberts and Wagner each made
this argument at the Cornell School of Hotel Administration's annual Labor and Employment
Roundtable in 2006.
180. See sources cited supra note 17 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of "fees
cases."
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mock jurors.181 On each of four separate days, over a two year period,
groups of students ranging in size from fifty to 130 watched the videotaped
presentation of the case statements. Immediately after watching the video
presentation of the case statements, each student was randomly assigned to
one of three rooms where different jury instruction scenarios were
presented. Students listened to the jury instructions and then completed their
own special jury verdict sheet. 182
The experimental manipulation involved the jury instruction. Three
randomly-assigned student groups heard one of three jury instruction
scenarios: (1) pretext (P) (N=133); (2) motivating factor (MF) (N=142); and
(3) motivating factor without the affirmative defense (MFWO) (N=138).
Students assigned to the MFWO and the P groups knew that they were
awarding all or nothing ($50,000) based on their answer to one question.
Students assigned to the motivating factor group, in contrast, confronted
a two-part verdict question. Motivating factor jurors that concluded that the
employee did not meet his legal burden answered only the first question.
Motivating factor jurors that concluded that the employee did, in fact, meet
his legal burden proceeded to the second question involving the employer's
affirmative defense. Motivating factor jurors that concluded that the
employee had met its legal burden and that the employer failed to prove its
affirmative defense understood that they were awarding the employee
$50,000. Motivating factor jurors did not know, however, that they were
awarding costs and fees if they concluded that: (1) the employee met its
legal burden and (2) the employer likewise proved its affirmative defense.
In other words, those jurors assumed (albeit incorrectly) that by finding that
the employee and employer met their respective burdens that the end result
would be no recovery for the plaintiff. Motivating factor jurors had no idea
that such an outcome resulted in employees receiving costs and fees.
Our experiment sought to assess whether different jury instructions
would produce different results. That the three jury instructions do not
include the identical number of questions somewhat complicates our results.
The pretext and the motivating factor without the affirmative defense
instructions have one question each. The full motivating factor instruction,
in contrast, includes two questions. Moreover, the pretext and the
motivating factor instruction without the affirmative defense instructions
can generate only two possible results: (1) Yes, the plaintiff met its
181. Most of the participating students were attending Cornell's School of Hotel
Administration.
182. To minimize underreporting and esteem-based influences, the experiment was
conducted in a large auditorium and in classrooms; special jury verdict sheets were completed
anonymously.
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burden183 and thus, is entitled to $50,000 in damages plus costs and fees or
(2) no, the plaintiff failed to meet its burden and is therefore awarded
nothing.
In contrast, the full motivating factor instruction generates three possible
results. (1) Yes, the plaintiff proved that national origin was a motivating
factor. and no, the employer did not prove that it would have made the
decision regardless of national origin. This "Yes-No" outcome provides the
plaintiff with $50,000 in damages plus costs and fees. (2) Yes, the plaintiff
proved that national origin was a motivating factor, and yes, the employer
would have made the decision regardless of national origin. The "Yes-Yes"
outcome provides the plaintiff with cost and fees but no damages. (3) No,
the plaintiff failed to prove that national origin was a motivating factor. A
no answer to the first question results in a complete victory for the
employer. Because the "Yes-No" and "Yes-Yes" results (outcomes 1 and 2,
above) provide different awards, we separated responses to the pretext and
the motivating factor without the affirmative defense instructions. We also
compared the results of the single question instructions to each other. In all,
the three separate jury instructions, some with multiple questions, generate
five separate comparisons of interest.
D. Results
Overall, our results illustrate how jury instruction variations in the
employment discrimination context can inform case outcomes. Statistically
significant differences emerge in four of our five comparisons.
Although our findings emphasize how jury instruction differences can
influence case outcomes, in one pairing--comparing pretext and full
motivating factor jury instructions-no statistical difference emerged. As
Table 1 illustrates, in nine of the full motivating factor cases (6%), jurors
found for the plaintiff on both questions (i.e., "Yes-No") and thus, awarded
damages along with costs and fees. The jurors found for the plaintiff in
seventeen of the pretext cases (12%). This suggests that the burden of proof
with regard to damages (i.e., back pay, reinstatement, punitive and
compensatory) is irrelevant and lawyers and clients should not waste
valuable time arguing over related jury instructions. 184
183. The plaintiff carried his burden in the pretext case by proving he was not promoted
because of his national origin. He met his burden in the national origin case by proving that
national origin was a motivating factor in the decision not to promote him.
184. P=0.098 (Fisher's exact, two-tailed).
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Table 1: Motivating Factor with the Affirmative Defense vs. Pretext:
Complete Plaintiff Victory vs. Complete Plaintiff Victory
Motivating Factor
(w/Affirm. Def) Pretext
No, plaintiff not awarded damages 133 116
Yes, plaintiff awarded damages 9 17
N 142 133
One practical consequence flowing from the CRA of 1991 is that
damages are no longer the only relevant issue in many employment
discrimination cases. Now, costs and fees often arise as a separate issue.
Prior to the CRA of 1991, juror conclusions that "Yes, national origin
motivated the employer, but yes, the employer would have not promoted the
employee regardless of national origin," resulted in a complete victory for
the employer. After the CRA of 1991, however, the identical juror
conclusion would result in plaintiffs receiving attorney fees and litigation
costs. 85 Notably, while jury instruction variations might not influence
general damage awards (Table 1), our results suggest that such jury
instruction variations do influence costs and fees awards. A focus on
liability alone risks ignoring associated fees and costs which are frequently
a critical element in many contested employment discrimination cases.
While only 9 of 142 motivating factor jurors found the company liable,
57 (40%) found that national origin motivated the employer. Of these fifty-
seven jurors, however, forty-eight concluded that the company would have
reached the same decision regardless of national origin. As a result, these
forty-eight jurors, likely unwittingly, awarded costs and fees to the
employee. As Table 2 illustrates, the number of motivating factor jurors
(fifty-seven) who found that national origin did motivate the employer
significantly differed from the number of pretext jurors (seventeen) who
found that the employer was liable. 86 These findings suggest that while a
motivating factor instruction may not influence liability, it significantly
increases a litigating employee's prospects for receiving costs and fees.
185. According to plaintiffs' attorney Lee Bantle, Bantle & Levy LLP, costs are often at
least $25,000. Fees can exceed $500,000.
186. P=0.001 (Fisher's exact, two-tailed).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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Table 2: Motivating Factor with the Affirmative Defense vs. Pretext:
Costs and Fees vs. Complete Plaintiff Victory
Motivating Factor
(w/Affirm. Def.) Pretext
No: No recovery for plaintiff 85 116
Yes: Costs & fees in column 1 v. 57 17
full recovery in column 2
N 142 133
We also compared the pretext instruction i"7 with the motivating factor
without the affirmative defense instruction.'" Both instructions involve a
single question and result in an all or nothing award to the plaintiff. In other
words, if a juror concluded that the employer was liable, the employee
would receive $50,000 in addition to costs and fees. If a juror concluded
that the employer was not liable, the employee received nothing. As Table 3
illustrates, seventeen of the jurors (12%) found for the plaintiff in the
pretext cases and thirty-two of the jurors (23%) found for the plaintiff in the
motivating factor without the affirmative defense cases. The differences in
Table 3 achieve statistical significance and suggest that employers fare
better with the pretext instruction than with the motivating factor without
affirmative defense instruction. 
189
Table 3: Motivating Factor without the Affirmative Defense vs.
Pretext: Full Recovery vs. Full Recovery
Motivating Factor
(w/o Affirm. Def.) Pretext
No, plaintiff not awarded damages 106 116
Yes, plaintiff awarded damages 32 17
N 138 133
187. Did plaintiff Estefan Ruiz establish by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant
discriminated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the basis
of his national origin with respect to the decision not to offer him a promotion in December
2003?
188. Did plaintiff Estefan Ruiz establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his
national origin was a motivating factor in the decision by defendant, Rochester Chronicle, Inc.,
not to offer him a promotion in December 2003?
189. P=0.028 (Fisher's exact).
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To isolate possible differences solely attributable to the presence of an
affirmative defense in the jury instruction, we compared motivating factor
cases that included the affirmative defense with motivating factor cases that
excluded the affirmative defense. As Table 4 illustrates, with respect to
liability, while thirty-two jurors (23%) found the employer liable in
motivating factor cases that lacked an affirmative defense jury instruction,
only nine jurors (6%) found for the plaintiff when the jury instruction
included an employer affirmative defense. The differences in Table 4 are
highly significant.190
Table 4: Motivating Factor with the Affirmative Defense vs. Motivating
Factor without the Affirmative Defense:
Full Recovery vs. Full Recovery
Motivating Factor Motivating Factor
(w/Affirm. Def.) (w/o Affirm. Def.)
No, plaintiff not awarded damages 133 106
Yes, plaintiff awarded damages 9 32
N 142 138
We also assessed how jurors answered Question 1 in motivating factor
with (and without) an affirmative defense jury instructions.191 As it relates
to the first question about whether the plaintiff established a motivating
factor, jurors with the affirmative defense answered "Yes" in fifty-seven
(40%) instances and jurors with an instruction that excluded an employer
affirmative defense answered "Yes" in thirty-two (23%) instances (Table 5).
Differences in how the jurors answered the first question achieve statistical
significance. 192
190. P=0.001 (Fisher's exact).
191. Again, Question 1 is identical for both instructions. What distinguishes the two jury
instructions is that the motivating factor jury with the affirmative defense instruction includes a
second question.
192. P=0.003 (Fisher's exact).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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Table 5: Motivating Factor with the Affirmative Defense (Q.1) vs.
Motivating Factor without the Affirmative Defense (Q.1):
Costs and Fees vs. Full Recovery
Mixed-Motive
Mixed-Motive (w/o Affirm.
Def.)
No, plaintiff not awarded damages 85 106
Yes, plaintiff awarded damages 57 32
N 142 138
III. DISCUSSION
The question we sought to answer is whether jury instructions matter.
Based on results from our structured scenario jury instruction experiment, it
seems that they do. Assuming facts that could go either way, employers
have a substantially equal chance of prevailing in pretext and motivating
factor cases, but there is a non-trivial chance that a motivating factor
instruction will result in costs and fees being awarded. Employers,
therefore, are better off with a pretext instruction than a motivating factor
instruction.
If a judge orders a motivating factor instruction, however, the employer
confronts a difficult choice involving whether to include an employer's
affirmative defense in the jury instruction. To be sure, the full motivating
factor jury instruction will more likely yield a complete victory than the
MFWO for the employer. This does not mean, however, that the MFWO
instruction should not be considered. An employer who chooses the MFWO
reduces its exposure to costs and fees awards compared to employers who
choose the full motivating factor jury instruction (remember there is no
"splitting of the baby" in the MFWO). The question that arises is whether
the employer should pursue including the second question (an employer's
affirmative defense) if the judge orders a motivating factor instruction.
Results from our study suggest that the answer depends on the case. If
the case is a "fees case" (low liability, but high attorney's fees),193 the
employer should go with the MFWO. If the employer's prospect for
expensive liability is high (i.e., the potential damages are substantial),
however, the employer should pursue the full motivating factor jury
instruction. Both of these options, however, are less desirable than the
193. See sources cited supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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pretext jury instruction for employers. Results from our study suggesting
that the burden of proof influences employment discrimination litigation
outcomes, only increases the stakes for employers as they asses their
options.
The fact that differing burdens of proof produce different results does
not, by definition, mean there is a problem. If there was a legitimate
rationale for the different burdens, the altered result would not only be
acceptable, it would be desired. Regrettably, this is not the case. As noted
above, after Costa and prior to Gross, there was no clear standard as to
when courts would apply the motivating factor instruction and not the
pretext instruction. After Gross, the problem remains in Title VII cases,
while a new problem arises in ADEA, ADA, and retaliation cases. Not only
does the motivating factor not apply, litigants are now arguing that
McDonnell Douglas does not apply either. In fact, in the short time period
between Gross and the writing of this article, there have been numerous
cases where parties argued that McDonnell Douglas did not apply.194 In
each case, however, district courts rejected these arguments and applied
McDonnell Douglas. Thus, the burden of proof can be generally distilled as
follows: McDonnell Douglas is the standard in all ADEA, ADA, and some
retaliation cases. In Title VII cases, courts, with no real guidance or
standards, can choose whether to apply the McDonnell Douglas or
motivating factor standard.
To solve this problem, Congress has proposed a bill, the Protecting Older
Workers Against Discrimination Act, House Bill 3721 (H.B. 3721),195 to
194. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 690-91 (3d Cir. 2009)
(distinguishing the shifting burdens in Price Waterhouse from those in McDonnell Douglas to
apply the latter's framework to plaintiffs ADEA claim); Frankel v. Peake, No. 07-3539, 2009
WL 3417448, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009) (holding the McDonnell Douglas framework
applicable to ADEA claims opposed on summary judgment); Ferruggia v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.,
No. 05-5992, 2009 WL 2634925, at **2-4, (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2009) (rejecting defendant's
contention that the Gross holding barred application of the Title VII burden-shifting framework
to all ADEA cases, rather than just mixed-motive cases); Holowecki v. Fed. Express Corp., 644
F. Supp. 2d 338, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (declining to decide whether the McDonnell Douglas
framework still applies to circumstantial ADEA claims-noting that Gross left the issue open-
because plaintiffs did not present even a colorable claim of discrimination).
195. Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 111th Cong.
(2009). Full text:
Section 1. Short Title.
This Act may be cited as the "Protecting Older Workers Against
Discrimination Act".
Sec. 2. Findings and Purpose.
(a) Findings.-Congress finds the following:
938 [Ariz. St. L.J.
HeinOnline  -- 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 938 2010-2011
THE GROSS BEAST OF BURDEN OF PROOF
(1) In enacting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
Congress intended to eliminate discrimination against individuals in the
workplace based on age.
(2) In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress correctly
recognized that unlawful discrimination is often difficult to detect and prove
because discriminators do not usually admit their discrimination and often try
to conceal their true motives.
(3) Congress has relied on a long line of court cases holding that
language in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and similar
antidiscrimination and antiretaliation laws, that is nearly identical to
language in title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would be interpreted
consistently with judicial interpretations of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, including amendments made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The
Supreme Court's decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S.
Ct. 2343 (2009), has eroded this long-held understanding of consistent
interpretation and circumvented well-established precedents.
(4) The holding of the Supreme Court in Gross, by requiring proof that
age was the "but for" cause of employment discrimination, has narrowed the
scope of protection intended to be afforded by the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, thus eliminating protection for many individuals
whom Congress intended to protect.
(5) The Supreme Court's holding in Gross, relying on misconceptions
about the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 articulated in prior
decisions of the Court, has significantly narrowed the broad scope of the
protections of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.
(6) Unless Congress takes action, victims of age discrimination will find
it unduly difficult to prove their claims and victims of other types of
discrimination may find their rights and remedies uncertain and
unpredictable.
(b) Purpose.-The purpose of this Act is to ensure that the standard for
proving unlawful disparate treatment under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 and other anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation
laws is no different than the standard for making such a proof under title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including amendments made by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.
Sec. 3. Standard of Proof.
Section 4 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29
U.S.C. 623) is amended by adding after subsection (f) the following:
"(g)(1) For any claim brought under this Act or any other authority
described in paragraph (5), a plaintiff establishes an unlawful employment
practice if the plaintiff demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence
that-
"(A) an impermissible factor under that Act or authority was a motivating
factor for the practice complained of, even if other factors also motivated that
practice; or
"(B) the practice complained of would not have occurred in the absence
of an impermissible factor.
"(2) On a claim in which a plaintiff demonstrates a violation under
paragraph (1)(A) and a defendant demonstrates that the defendant would
have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor, the court-
42:0901] 939
HeinOnline  -- 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 939 2010-2011
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
overturn Gross and hopefully solve the burden of proof problems associated
with discrimination law. While H.B. 3721 would overturn Gross, it would
not solve all the problems that need to be addressed.
In fact, current law includes four problems: (1) a curious distinction
between Title VII and the ADEA, the ADA, and retaliation claims; (2) the
lack of a clear standard in Title VII cases for deciding whether to follow the
McDonnell Douglas or motivating factor protocol; (3) jurors who think they
have awarded no damages unknowingly award costs and fees; and (4) the
definition of guilt may be overbroad. H.B. 3721 solves problem one, may
solve problem two, but does not solve problems three or four.
"(A) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in
subparagraph (B)), and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly
attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under paragraph (1); and
"(B) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission,
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment.
"(3) In making the demonstration required by paragraph (1), a plaintiff
may rely on any type or form of admissible circumstantial or direct evidence
and need only produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to
conclude that a violation described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph
(1) occurred.
"(4) Every method for proving either such violation, including the
evidentiary framework set forth in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973), shall be available to the plaintiff.
"(5) This subsection shall apply to any claim that the practice complained
of was motivated by a reason that is impermissible, with regard to that
practice, under-
"(A) this Act, including subsection (d);
"(B) any Federal law forbidding employment discrimination;
"(C) any law forbidding discrimination of the type described in
subsection (d) or forbidding other retaliation against an individual for
engaging in, or interference with, any federally protected activity including
the exercise of any right established by Federal law (including a
whistleblower law); or
"(D) any provision of the Constitution that protects against
discrimination or retaliation.
"(6) This subsection shall not apply to a claim under a law described in
paragraph (5)(C) to the extent such law has an express provision regarding
the legal burdens of proof applicable to that claim.
"(7) In any proceeding, with respect to a claim described in paragraph
(5), the plaintiff need not plead the existence of this subsection.
"(8) In this subsection, the term 'demonstrates' means meet the burdens
of production and persuasion.".
Sec. 4. Application.
This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall apply to all claims
described in section 4(g)(4) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (29 U.S.C. 623(g)(4)) pending on or after June 17, 2009.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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H.B. 3721, as proposed, certainly addresses the first problem by allowing
the motivating factor standard of proof to be used in ADEA cases and,
according to proposed Sections 4(g)(5)(b), (c), and (d), in all other cases
filed under any federal employment discrimination statute or the United
States Constitution.
Moreover, H.B. 3721 may also solve problem two. Section 4(g)(4) reads:
"Every method for proving either such violation, including the evidentiary
framework set forth in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green,196 411 U.S. 792
(1973), shall be available to the plaintiff." '197 On its face, this seems to stand
for the proposition that it is now up to the plaintiffs in ADEA cases and all
other cases to choose whether to follow the McDonnell Douglas or the
mixed-motive standard. Such a standard would eliminate the current
amorphous state of affairs where jurisdictions or judges determine the
burden of proof with no true guidelines. Sadly, we cannot confidently state
that H.B. 3721, as currently written, will, in fact, solve this problem.
Section 2(b) reads:
The purpose of this Act is to ensure that the standard for
proving unlawful disparate treatment under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and other anti-
discrimination and anti-retaliation laws is no different than the
standard for making such a proof under title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, including amendments made by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.198
Neither Title VII nor the CRA of 1991 allows plaintiffs to choose the
framework under which their case is to be decided. Instead, courts choose.
Accordingly, either: (1) Section 2(b) should not be read as limiting the new
law and thus, H.B. 3721 amended Title VII to allow plaintiffs to choose
which burden of proof framework they would like to use; or (2) proposed
Section 4(g)(4) is not as broad as it appears and it really means that the
motivating factor framework is now available in all discrimination cases,
but the choice remains with the court; or (3) Title VII is not affected by
H.B. 3721, and thus now the motivating factor instruction is available to all
ADEA (and seemingly ADA and retaliation) plaintiffs who choose it, but
subject to the discretion of the court in Title VII cases.
While it seems problematic, this issue is easily finessed. To be consistent
with the language of the statute and with the reality of how employment
discrimination decisions are made, it follows that plaintiffs should have
196. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
197. H.R. 3721 sec. 3, § 4(g)(4).
198. H.R. 3721 sec. 2(b).
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their choice as to which framework under which to proceed. H.B. 3721
could be clarified, hundreds of appeals could be avoided, and thousands of
law review pages could be rendered moot as the problem would be solved.
Indeed, as discussed above, after Costa, there is simply no justifiable reason
for distinguishing between the two types of cases. Put simply, plaintiffs
should be able to choose their framework.
Solving the first two problems does not, however, solve problems three
or four. It is helpful to examine problem four first. Price Waterhouse held
that the burden of proof shifted to the employer if the employee proved,
with direct evidence, that discrimination was a "substantial factor" in the
employer's decision. '99 The CRA of 1991 and the Protecting Older Workers
Against Discrimination Act change the language to "motivating factor."
This does not seem problematic. Price Waterhouse held that if the employer
proved it would have made the same decision regardless of discrimination,
it was absolved of all liability. The CRA of 1991 and the Protecting Older
Workers Against Discrimination Act change this to providing a declaratory
judgment and costs and fees.
H.B. 3721 does not address the fact that the motivating factor standard
may be overbroad. It seems that the standard flies in the face of reality. Is it
not true that even absent any evidence to support such an inference, any
jury could legitimately find, for example, that decisions made by all male
decision makers were motivated in part by a woman's gender? How about a
decision to discharge a seventy year-old employee? Can we really argue
that decision makers, even those over forty or even sixty, would not be
motivated, at least in part, by the employee's age? Even if this were the
case, would any jury believe that age played no motivating role?... Social
science research and common sense tell us that age, race, sex, color,
religion, national origin, and disabilities motivate people.' Should that be
unlawful when it did not affect the decision?
199. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 265-66 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
200. See Ronald C. Kessler et al., The Prevalence, Distribution, and Mental Health
Correlates of Perceived Discrimination in the United States, 40 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 208,
224 (1999) (noting that over sixty percent of respondents to a national survey perceived
discrimination in their day-to-day lives).
201. See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson et al., Divergent Paths: Conflicting Conceptions of
Employment Discrimination in Law and the Social Sciences, 4 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 103,
115-16 (2008) (arguing that the requirement of purposeful discrimination in employment law
ignores modem social science research regarding the pervasiveness of unconscious bias in
employment decisions); Norton et al., supra note 122, at 47; Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I.
Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral Justifications: Experimental Examination of
Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 269 (2006)
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Consider the following hypothetical. A company has a policy of
terminating every employee who comes to work intoxicated. This standard
has been applied to employees of all ages, religions, races, colors, genders,
and national origins. The company also has a report from a consultant that
its employees are out of touch, and that it needs to "get younger." The
company acknowledges the truth of the report, but rejects the advice
because of the ADEA. Now, a sixty-five year-old employee comes to work
intoxicated and the company, in accordance with policy, terminates the
employee. Will a jury think that age was a motivating factor? If so, should
the company that wished to "get younger," but did not act on it because of
the law, be penalized for complying with a legitimate policy that ensured
safety? Should motives that do not affect decisions be the basis of guilt? In
a multi-cultural society that has not evolved to be the melting pot we all
idealized in grammar school, is such a standard realistic? Assuming this is
not realistic, but is nonetheless the law, will employers accept that costs and
fees are now automatic in all cases and that the cost of settling such cases
has risen expediently? Or, will employers attempt to avoid such cases? The
best way to avoid discrimination is to have a homogeneous workforce.
Could the on-call motivating factor instruction paradoxically lead to more
discrimination?
The easiest way to solve this issue is to simply return to the legal
standard articulated in Price Waterhouse. Employers can absolve
themselves of liability if they can prove that the decision in question would
have been made regardless of the protected class. Such a standard, we
contend, is generally consistent with social science (and, perhaps, common
sense). We also contend that this, of course, will not happen. That does not
mean, however, that the issues cannot be resolved. In fact, they can be
resolved by solving problem number three.
As our results imply, jurors in our study believed that answering "No" to
the first question in the mixed-motive instruction ("Did plaintiff.
establish ... that his national origin was a motivating factor in the decision
by defendant") was the same as answering "Yes" and then answering "Yes"
to the question of whether the employer would have made its decision
regardless of the protected class. In other words, jurors who answered
"Yes" to both questions likely assumed they were finding in favor of the
employer and not the employee. In one sense the jurors were correct: as it
related to liability, the employer prevailed. What those jurors likely did not
realize, however, is that by answering "Yes" to both questions they were, in
(finding juror race influences peremptory challenge use despite decision makers' justifying their
decisions with non-racial criteria).
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fact, awarding litigating employees costs and fees. Similarly, the number of
jurors who answered "Yes" to Question 1 was significantly higher when
they could use the affirmative defense to avoid awarding damages.
It remains possible that jurors will find protected classes motivate
decision makers even when they do not believe that the plaintiff was
discriminated against or deserves any type of damage award. Accordingly,
we have a simple proposal to solve problems three and four identified
above. The special jury verdict sheet should state that answering "Yes-Yes"
will result in the employer paying the plaintiffs costs and fees. Jurors who
believe that the motivation was discrimination should not be affected by the
change. They will award costs and fees. Conversely, jurors who believe that
protected classes always motivate decisions as simply a cost of living in a
diverse country, but saw no discrimination will answer "No" and award no
costs and fees.
IV. CONCLUSION
Burden of proof assignments matter. The so-called motivating factor
instruction will result in costs and fees being awarded significantly more
often than in pretext cases or motivating factor cases without the defense. In
cases where the motivating factor instruction is used without the defense,
the plaintiffs have a significantly better chance of prevailing than they do in
cases using the pretext or full motivating factor instruction. Our full
proposal, we contend, solves all the current problems associated with the
current burden of proof. First, by overturning Gross, all discrimination
cases are now equal. Second, letting plaintiffs choose whether to use the
motivating factor jury instruction will not only end the legal fiction of
letting judges decide facts, it could make cases easier for plaintiffs to prove.
Flipping burdens of proof is not a small change, as employers will be forced
to prove a negative. If they do so, we contend jurors should only award
damages, in the form of costs and fees, if they intend to do so.
[Ariz. St. L.J.944
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APPENDIX
I. PRETEXT SCENARIO
Jury Instruction:
Plaintiff bases his lawsuit on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a
law that makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an
employee on the basis of national origin. To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was denied a
promotion by Defendant because of his national origin.20 2 To determine
that Plaintiff was denied a promotion because of his national origin, you
must decide that Defendant would have promoted Plaintiff had he not been
of Mexican national origin but everything else was the same.
If you find that Plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence
each of the things required of him, then you must find for Plaintiff
However, if you find that Plaintiff did not prove by a preponderance of the
evidence each of the things required of him, then you must find for
Defendant.
Special Verdict Sheet:
1. Did plaintiff Estefan Ruiz establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that defendant discriminated against him in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the basis of his national origin with
respect to the decision not to offer him a promotion in December 2003?
Yes No
If you answered "no " to Question 1, sign the special verdict form on the
last page. If you answered "yes" to Question 1, plaintiff is entitled to
recover back pay damages. The parties have stipulated that the total
amount of back pay to be awarded to plaintiff is $50,000. Check the box
below to signify that the plaintiff is entitled to damages of $50, 000 and then
sign the special verdict form.
202. We use national origin here, but it could be any of the seven protected classes: sex,
race, color, national origin, religion, age, or disability.
945
HeinOnline  -- 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 945 2010-2011
ARIZONA STATE LA W JOURNAL
II. MIXED-MOTIVE SCENARIO
Jury Instruction:
Plaintiff bases his lawsuit on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a
law that makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an
employee on the basis of national origin. To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his national origin was
a motivating factor in Defendant's decision not to offer him a promotion. A
motivating factor is something that contributed to Defendant's decision.
If you find that Plaintiff has proved that his national origin contributed
to Defendant's decision not to offer him a promotion, you must then decide
whether Defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it would
have not offered him a promotion even if Plaintiff was not of Mexican
national origin. If you find that the Defendant has proven that it would not
have offered him a promotion even in the absence of discrimination, you
must still enter a verdict for the Plaintiff but you may not award him
damages.
Special Verdict Sheet:
1. Did plaintiff Estefan Ruiz establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that his national origin was a motivating factor in the decision by
defendant, Rochester Chronicle, Inc., not to offer him a promotion in
December 2003?
Yes No
You should answer the next question only if you answered "yes " to
Question 1. If you answered Question 1 "no, " you should not answer any
further questions but sign this special verdict form on the last page and
return the form to the clerk.
2. Did defendant establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant would have treated plaintiff the same way even if the plaintiff's
national origin had not played any role in the employment decision?
Yes No
If you answered '"yes " to Question 2, sign the special verdict form on the
last page. If you answered "no" to Question 2, plaintiff is entitled to
recover back pay damages. The parties have stipulated that the total
946 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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amount of back pay to be awarded to plaintiff is $50, 000. Check the box
below to signify that the plaintiff is entitled to damages of $50, 000 and then
sign the special verdict form.
III. MIXED-MOTIVE WITHOUT THE SECOND PRONG SCENARIO
Jury Instruction:
Plaintiff bases his lawsuit on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a
law that makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an
employee on the basis of national origin. To succeed on this claim, Plaintif
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his national origin was
a motivating factor in Defendant's decision not to offer him a promotion. A
motivating factor is something that contributed to Defendant's decision.
If you find that Plaintiff has proved that his national origin contributed
to Defendant's decision not to offer him a promotion, you must enter a
verdict for the Plaintiff even ifyou believe that there were other motivating
factors that would have caused the Defendant not to offer him a promotion
even in the absence of any discriminatory motivation.
Special Verdict Sheet:
1. Did plaintiff Estefan Ruiz establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that his national origin was a motivating factor in the decision by
defendant, Rochester Chronicle, Inc., not to offer him a promotion in
December 2003?
Yes No
If you answered "yes " to Question 1, plaintiff is entitled to recover back
pay damages. The parties have stipulated that the total amount of back pay
to be awarded to plaintiff is $50,000. Check the box below to signify that
the plaintiff is entitled to damages of $50,000 and then sign the special
verdict form.
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